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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

GARY MUGLESTON, by his Guardian ad litem, KENNETH MUGLESTON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
Case No. 7676

vs.
EMIL R. GLAITTLI,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF

APPELL~T

NATURE OF THE CASE
This suit was brought by the respondent, Gary Mugleston,
by his guardian ad litem, Kenneth lvfugleston, against the
appellant, Emil R. Glaittli, to recover damages for personal
injuries sustained by the respondent as the result of the ap.:
pellant' s minor son driving an automobile in which the respondent was a passenger, v1hich said automobile, on a sharp
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turn went off the highway- and into the bar pit on the 13th
day of September, 1950, wherein judgment was rendered in
favor of the respondent and against the appellant for the sum
of Three Hundred ( $300.00) and costs, by reason of which
this appeal is taken.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Upon the niglit in question the appellant and his wife
left their home at 225 Paxton Avenue, in Salt Lake City, Utah,
in company with another couple and went to a picture show
in the automobile of the other couple. There were several
youngsters around the place at the time the appellant and
wife left the home with the other party, at w~ich time one
of the youngsters suggested that they all get in the truck and
go for a ride, which was agreed, and the son of the appellant
got in the truck under the .wheel and started out for a ride.
They went west on 17th South, and when they arrived a~ a
sharp turn at the end of 17th South and into 4th West, the
son of appellant lost control of the car and it went off the road
and caused the injury to the plaintiff. It appears that before
leaving home the appellant warned his son to leave the cars
alone except to drive them in the garage, and particularly
advised him that he should not get any funny ideas and attempt
to take the_ cars out on the street. Out of this situation the
injured boy, through his guardian ad litem, brought a suit
against the appellant, the father of the boy who took his
-father's car with the ~ther children in it including the respond·
ent, after his father and n1other had gone to a picture show

4

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and after the father, appellant herein, specifically directed him
not to take the car out on the street and attetnpt to drive it.
Upon this statement of facts this action arose.

STATEMENT OF POINTS UPON WHICH
APPELLANT RELIES
Point 1. ~'as the appellant in any way responsible for the
injury to the respondent, and under the circumstances that
existed, can appellant be charged with negligence that would
support a judgment against him?
Point 2. Is a parent, in his absence, and who has not
directed the son to use the automobile on the specific occasion
in question, nor consented to its use, responsible t~ a third
party (the respondent herein) for an in jury to such third party ?
Point 3. Can a party who is a guest passenger in an automobile recover for damages sustained by him without charging
intoxication or willful misconduct as the proximate cause of
such injury or damage, and establishing such allegation by
competent proof against the party charged?

ARGUMENT
Point 1. Was the appellant in any way responsible
for the injury to the respondent, and under the circumstances
that existed, can appellant be charged with negligence that
\Vould support a judgment against him?
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This point largely covers the situation before us. There
is no dispute about the facts of the case, that is, that the minor
son of the appellant was driving the automobile and that while
so doing, the respondent was injured, but is the injury he
suffered chargeable to the appellant?
Having come into this case after the same was tried and
judgment entered, it is just a little difficult to understand why
the judgment was entered, as the evidence shows that before
the father and mother left the home that night the father said
to the boy, (CT ake and drive the cars in and don't get any ideas
of going out with them. We will be back after awhile." That
shortly after the father and mother left, he stated, ccwe got in
the truck and went after we talked it over. We had already
had things planned the time they were starting to go." Transcript, Page 57.
Perhaps the Court had 1n mind Section 57-4-26 of the
1943 revised statutes which states as follows:
((Every owner of a motor vehicle causing or knowingly permitting a minor under the age of eighteen
years to drive such vehicle upon a highway, and any
person who gives or furnishes a motor vehicle to such
minor, shall be jointly and severally liable for such
minor and any damages caused by the negligence of
such minor in driving such vehicle.''
Also Section 67-4-31, sub-section (a) :
((No person shall authorize or knowingly permit a
motor vehicle owned by him or under his control to
be driven by any person who has no legal right to
do so in violation of any provisions of this Act."

6
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Ho\vever, I cannot. believe that the Court could have followed these sections, as to the provision, ((causing or knowingly
permitting." Certainly there is no evidence in this record to
support the fact that the father either knew, caused or knowingly permitted the boy to take the car on to the highway. In
fact, the evidence is just contrary to such a proposition.
From going into the cases upon the facts in this case we
find that the overwhelming weight of authority is contrary to
a judgment in this case as against the father, the defendant
herein.
I first refer to ~9 American Jurisprl.i.dence, Page 691,
which recites as follows:
((The parent is not liable merely because the child
lives at home with him, works for him, and is under
his care, management, and control. Rather, liability
exists, apart from the parent's own negligence, only
where t..lJe tortious act is done by the child as the servant or agent of the parent, or _where the act is consented to or ratified by the parent. The rule that the
parent is not liable holds true whether he is present
or absent when the tort of the chi] d is committed.''
In 5 American Jurisprudence, page 701, Section 369
under automobiles we quote the following:
(tin order, however, to hold the parent liable on the
theory of responsibility under a doctrine of respondeat
superior, a child must have been acting upon the scope
of his employment. Even conceding the existence
of an agency or master and servant relationship, the
parent cannot be held responsible for an act of the
duld while engaged in some private matter of his own,
7
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unleSs- the parent, · with full knowledge ·of the facts,
ratifies the act of the child. The question of liability,
if any, in cases where there may be an issue of fact
as to the nature of the mission in which the child may
be engaged by other than his or her personal ends and
pleasure and is to be determined upon the facts of each
particular case."
In the case of Schafer vs. Osterbrink, 30 Northwestern
922 at page 925 it holds that:
nln order to charge the father, defendant Everhart,
with the consequences of Henry's negligence, it must
appear from the evidence satisfactorily to your minds
that the relation between them of master and servant
existed at the time; that Henry was the servant of his
father; and that the negligent acts of Henry were committed in the line of his employment as such servant.
And again it is undisputed that the defendants were,
at the time, father and son, and that the son was a
minor. This relation does not of its own, render the
father liable· for the wrongful conduct of the son."
Referring to Stumpf vs. Montgomery, 226 Pacific, page
65, we find the following:
celt is conceded that there is no liability on a parent
as such for the tort of a child. The liability of a parent
for the act of a minor child rests upon the basic facts
. as a liability of the master for the acts of a servant.
celt is well settled that even though the driver of a car
is a servant of the owner of the car, the owner is not
liable unless at the time of the accident the driver was
acting. within the scope of his authority in regards
to his master's business.'' (Citing numerous cases) .
8
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The case of McFarlane vs. Winters, Utah Case 155 P 437,
holds as follows:
HWe have carefully read the evidence which is preserved in a bill of exceptions, and we have been unable
to arrive at the conclusion that, under the facts and
circumstances disclosed by the evidence, the father,
under the law, can be held responsible for the acts of
the son, which acts the jury found caused the accident
and the consequential injuries and damages as before
stated. It conclusively appeared from .the evidence
that Dr. Winters was not present at the time and place
of the accident, and therefore had no control over the
son in driving and managing the automobile, and that
he knew nothing concerning the accident until after
it had occurred. The plaintiff, however, sought to
establish .the doctor's liability upon the theory that
the automobile was owned by him, that it had theretofore been driven by the son in the father's business affairs, and that at the time of the accident it was being
driven by the son in the father's affairs. In other
words, the plaintiff seeks to hold the father responsible
for the acts of the son upon the theory of principal and
agent or that of master and servant. All the evidence
produced by the plaintiff relating to the question now
under consideration is in substance; as follows: the
plaintiff and the last two of his witnesses testified that
they knew of the automobile in question; that it was
owned by Dr. Winters, and that he used it in his business of practicing medicine; that prior to the accident
they, on several occasions, had seen the son driving the
car, both when the doctor was in it and when other
members of his family were in the car with the son
. . . . It will be observed that from plaintiff's evidence
in the case it was made to appear that the automobile
in question was, in fact, in the possession and under
the control of Glen Winters, the son, so that what must
9
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·be. inferred in this case is that Glen was the servant
or agent of his father and was engaged in the latter's
business affairs at the time and place of the accident.
Can such an inference be legitimately deduced from
the mere fact that Glen was at the time driving an
automobile owned by his father? Is not the inference
just as nah1ral and quite as strong that Glen was driving
the automobile either for his own use or for the use
of someone other than the father . . . . It is certainly
going to what we consider, undue lengths to hold that,
because an automobile or any other vehicle or instrumentality is shown to be owned by one person, but is
found in the· possession and use of another, the only
legitimate inference to be deduced from such fact is
that such other person is the agent or servant of the
owner, and is using the instrumentality in the O\rner's
business affairs or for his use and benefit . . . in this
case judgment was entered against the minor son and
'vas withheld against the father, owner of the automobile.
In the case of Watkins vs. Clark, Kansas Case, 176 Pacific,
page 131, which was an action for damages for personal injuries which the plaintiff suffered in an automobile accident:
nA demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence was sustained and he appeals ... In this case the father was
charged with negligence in permitting his daughter
to operate the family car which resulted in the injury.
The demurrer to the evidence was properly sustained.
There was neither admission nor evidence to submit
to the jury proving prima facie or otherwise, or tending
to prove that the defendant's daughter was acting for
him as agent, or servant, or in any other representative
-.capacity., or under his direction or control, or in any
joint enterprise from which agency might be implied.
10
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HThe automobile was not a dangerous instrumen·
tality \Yhich the defendant let loose in the community.
The automobile was not a guilty agent in the accident,
bringing punishment on the owner, like the deodands
of English law. Management by the driver was the
cause of the accident.',
The case of Knight vs. Gossitt was a case of joint owner·
ship of an automobile between the father and his 23-year-old
son. An accident occurred while the son was driving, the son
being on his own busines, held, that the evidence was not suf·
ficient to establish the relation of master and servant between
the father and the son.
In the case of Boling vs. Asbridge, 203 Pacific 894, it is
held as follows:
In presenting the second assignrnent of error counsel
do not seem to disagree upon the general principal
that, when the plaintiff in an action seeks to charge the
owner of an automobile with liability for an in jury
inflicted by the car while it was being operated by an·other, the burden is on the plaintiff not only to show
that an injury \vas the proximate result of the negligence
of the operator, but also that such person was the servant or agent of the defendant, and was at the time of
such negligence, acting within the scope of his employment. Quoting Berry on automobiles, 68 3.''
cc

Quoting from the case of Smith vs. Jordan, Massachusetts,
97 Northeastern 761:
"Where a father was possessed of an automobile
which he kept upon his premises, and his daughter,
about 19 years of age, was accustomed to drive it and
did so whenever she felt like it, asking permission
11
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to use it when the father was at home, and when not
at home took it sometimes without permission, there
being no proof that the daughter was actually employed
by the father to operate the machine, held, in an action
against the father, where the daughter, in using the
machine for her own pleasure in driving her personal
friends, negligently injured a person in the highway,
that such proof was not sufficient to constitute the
daughter the servant or agent of the master, and that
a motion for a direction of a verdict for the defendant
should have prevailed."
In the case of Blair vs. Broadcaster, Virginia, 93 Southeastern, page 632, it is held:
tcThe principals of law which govern this case are
plain. A father is not liable for the torts of his minor
son, simply because of paternity. There must exist an
authority from the father to the son to do the tortuous
act, or a subsequent ratification and adoption of it,
before responsibility attaches to the parent. The
wrongful act must be performed by the son in performance of the business, incident, or undertaking
authorized bv the father before the latter can be held
liable. If th~ act is not done by the son in furtherance
of the father's business, but in performance of some
individual design of his own the father is not liable.
The controlling rules of law are the same, whether the
business in question concerns the operation of an autobile or any other matter."
In the case of Parker vs. Wilson, Alabama Case 60 Southern, page 150, it is held:
tCGeneral principals of law governing the case are
more or less familiar. The mere fact of paternity
does not make the father liable for the torts- of his
12
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minor child .... a strict relation of master and servant
invariably arises out of contract express or implied.
It involves an agreement by the servant to do something
for the master and the master's liability to strangers
for the negligence of his servant is founded upon the
argument that he controls the manner of the performance of the thing to be done. As to third persons
the minor child may become by particular arrangement
the servant of the father, and this without agreement
for compensation; but the relation of father and child
has never of itself sufficed that the common law, prevailing in this state, to make the child a servant of the
father within the meaning of the rule of respondeat
superior, or to impose upon the. parent liability for
torts committed without his knowledge or authority.
29 Cyc. 1665.
"The parents' responsibility in such case is governed
by the ordinary principals affecting the liability of a.
principal for the act of his agent or a master for his
servant."
While there are numerous cases supporting the propositions set forth in the cases cited, we do not deem it adviseable
to extend the quotations upon the principal involved.
That the cases cited do not support, but· are in direct opposition to the judgment entered against the appellant in this
case.
It naturally follows that the answer to Point Two, to-wit:
Point Two. Is a parent, in his absence and who has not
directed the son to use the automobile on the specific occasion
in question nor consented to its use, respo~sible to a third party
(the respondent herein) for an injury to such third party?

13
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From the cases referred to above we submit that Point
Two must be answered in the negative, that is, that the parent
is not responsible for the injury to the plaintiff herein under
the circumstances involved in the case.
Our next point in question is Point Three: Can a party who
is a guest passenger in an automobile recoyer for damages sustained by him without charging nintoxication or willful misconduct," as the proximate cause of such injury or damage and
establishing such allegation by competent proof against the
party charged?
This point refers to the statutory provision respecting guest
passengers. There is not any question but that the plaintiff
in this action was a guest passenger in the automobile from
which he received the injury complained of. We have Section
57-11-7 of .Revised Statutes of Utah 1943, which we refer to,
ccResponsibility of ovlner or driver of a vehicle to guest."
· CCAny person who, as a guest, accepts a ride in any
vehicle moving upon any of the public highways of
the State of Utah, and while so riding as such guest
receives or sustains an injury, shall have no right of
recovery against the owner or driver or any person
responsible for the operation of such vehicle . . . . If
such person so riding as a guest be a minor and sustain
an injury or be killed or die as a result of injury sustained while so riding as such guest, then neither the
parents nor guardians, nor the estate not legal representatives or heirs of such minor shall have any right
of recovery against the driver or owner or person responsible for the operation of said vehicle for injury
sustained or as a result of the death of such minor.~·
It follows in the section that if the owner or driver or person
.,

..
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is responsible for the operation of the vehicle while intoxicated or guilty of willful. misconduct, then such person can
be held.
The Complaint neither charges the operator of the car
with intoxication or willful misconduct, although the complaint
in Paragraph One designates the plaintiff as a guest in the automobile. While it, is true that the Complaint does not cover
this guest statute, ¢.e Answer in its first defense alleges that
the Complaint fails to state a claim against defendant upon
which relief can be granted, so I am assuming that the question
here was involved in the case, at least if not, the pleading in the
Answer _raises this question in the paragraph just above quoted,
and if the Court did not make a finding in accordance therewith
he should have done, as the point is certainly involved in the/
.
·
Fl"'SWtY
of the defendant.
CONCLUSION
We therefore submit that the Court erred in his Finding
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree entered in the above
entitled case, and that the same should be reversed by this
Court and returned to the District Court with an order directing
said Court to enter a judgment in favor of the defendant and
against the plaintiff of no cause of action.
Respectfully submitted,
SHIELDS & SHIELDS,
Attorneys for Defend,tnt and
Appellant
405 Felt Building ,
Salt Lake City, Utah
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